IRC over Tor
Instant Messaging Anonymous IRCv3 server on a Tor v3 onion address. No registration required. No IP logging. No identity required to chat.
About this server
This is an Ergo IRC daemon — a modern IRCv3 server written in Go, memory-safe, actively maintained, and configurable for privacy-first operation. It is not our software: we run an instance and support the project.
The server is reachable exclusively via a Tor v3 hidden service. There is no clearnet address. Your IP address is never visible to the server, and the server holds no data that could identify you. We have also published a proposal on forum.nym.net inviting operators to open IRCv3 ports 6667 and 6696 more broadly — we think the infrastructure is worth sustaining.
Connection details
Onion address
2xz3ngedsne2ngd3blpgnrqmeitffnzsnjacdjinu63yi5tjcyfitbid.onion
Ports
Port 6667 — plain IRC (no TLS — transport encryption provided by Tor)
Port 6696 — IRC with TLS 1.3 (recommended for IRC clients that support it)
On port 6696, the server certificate is self-signed — no certificate authority issues certs for .onion domains. Enable TLS and accept self-signed certificates in your client. On port 6667, no TLS is used at the IRC layer; the Tor circuit itself provides transport encryption.
Web client (Gamja)
Access directly from Tor Browser — no IRC client needed:
2xz3ngedsne2ngd3blpgnrqmeitffnzsnjacdjinu63yi5tjcyfitbid.onion/gamja/
Enter a nickname and connect immediately. No registration, no certificate, fully anonymous.
Two ways to connect
Option 1 — Web client (anonymous, instant)
Open Tor Browser, navigate to the Gamja address above, pick a nickname, chat. No setup, no account, no persistent identity. Best for occasional or one-off use.
Option 2 — IRC client + certificate (persistent identity)
Your TLS client certificate becomes your identity. One-time setup binds the certificate fingerprint to a nickname via NickServ. After that, connecting with the certificate authenticates you automatically — no password, no email, no further commands.
Certificate setup (one time)
Generate a P-384 keypair and self-signed certificate:
openssl ecparam -name secp384r1 -genkey -noout -out irc.key
openssl req -new -x509 -key irc.key -out irc.crt -days 3650 -subj "/CN=yournick"
cat irc.key irc.crt > irc.pem
Then in your IRC client:
- Set the client certificate to
irc.pem - Enable SSL, set login method to SASL EXTERNAL
- Accept self-signed server certificate
- Connect and run once:
/msg NickServ REGISTER * *
That single command binds your certificate fingerprint to your nickname.
No password (*), no email (*) — cryptographic
identity only. From then on, just connect: SASL EXTERNAL handles authentication
silently.
Privacy architecture
Defense in depth encryption
TLS 1.3 runs on top of Tor's circuit encryption — two independent layers. AEAD ciphers only: ChaCha20-Poly1305 and AES-256-GCM. If one layer were somehow compromised, the other still protects you.
Zero IP logging
Server config: lookup-hostnames: false. No IP addresses are
resolved or stored. Tor hides your IP from the server; the server config
ensures nothing identifiable is retained even from localhost connections.
IP cloaking
All visible hostnames shown in the channel are one-way cryptographic hashes
(*.user.anon). The transformation is irreversible — the original
address cannot be recovered from the hash.
Ephemeral history
Messages are stored in RAM only. Maximum retention: 1 hour or until server
restart. persistent: false — nothing is written to disk.
No metadata collection
metadata: enabled: false. No connection patterns, no timestamps
beyond immediate delivery, no user metadata stored.
Silent logging
Server logs exclude all user data: -userinput -useroutput
-localconnect -localconnect-ip. Only critical operational errors
are logged. Nothing about your session.
No email registration
email-verification: enabled: false. NickServ registration
accepts * * — certificate fingerprint is the only credential.
What we cannot do
- See your real IP address — Tor hidden service, no clearnet path
- Read your messages — end-to-end encrypted Tor circuit
- Recover deleted history — RAM only, no disk persistence
- Link your sessions — no tracking, no fingerprinting
- Comply with data requests — no data to provide
Technical details
Server software
Ergo — modern IRC daemon written in Go. Full IRCv3 compliance, memory-safe, privacy-first defaults, rehashable config at runtime. Source code: github.com/ergochat/ergo.
Encryption stack
- Layer 1 (Tor): Curve25519 key exchange, AES-256 circuit encryption, 3+ relay hops
- Layer 2 (TLS 1.3): ECDHE key exchange, ChaCha20-Poly1305 or AES-256-GCM, perfect forward secrecy
- Authentication: SASL EXTERNAL with ECDSA P-384 client certificates
Recommended clients
- Desktop: HexChat, WeeChat, Halloy
- Terminal: WeeChat, irssi (via
torsocksoroniux) - Mobile: Revolution IRC (Android)
- Web: Gamja — available directly on this server via Tor Browser
Open Tor Browser and connect immediately — no account, no setup, fully anonymous. Pick a nickname and start talking.
Open Web Chat (Tor Browser) → Server homepage →